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Abstract 
By adjusting the strength of IPRs protection, the government can change the extent of knowledge spillovers in R&D. 
A large spillover rate helps to improve the productivity of the less efficient firms and save on the overall production 
costs. But, at the same time, it reduces the innovator's incentives to conduct R&D and results in a lower equilibrium 
innovation level. So, there is an inherent tension between knowledge diffusion and technological progress. In this 
paper, we formalized this relationship in a two stage asymmetric duopoly model and discussed the optimal IPRs 
protection policy. The main conclusion is that, to maximize social welfare the strength of IPRs protection should rise 
as the increase of the innovating firm's R&D efficiency.
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1. Introduction
An inherent characteristic of the R&D process is the knowledge spillover eﬀects. Due
to spillovers, a ﬁrm can partly beneﬁt from the other ﬁrms’ innovation without any
payment. A consequence is that, the innovating ﬁrm will have less incentives to conduct
research compared to the case without spillovers. Since the seminal work of d’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988), this phenomenon is thoroughly analyzed by researchers. And, to
correct the incentive distortion some forms of R&D cooperation are suggested, like the
R&D cartelization, the RJV competition, and the RJV cartelization (Kamien, Muller
and Zang, 1992). Compared to R&D competition, cooperative research agreement may
have two opposite eﬀects on social welfare. On the one hand, it helps to correct the
innovating ﬁrms’ incentives to conduct R&D, but on the other hand, it also impairs the
market competition. Based on this, Leahy and Neary (1997) discussed theoretically the
appropriate policy stance should be taken towards R&D cooperation. 1A main conclusion
is that, with strategic behavior the payoﬀ from encouraging R&D cooperation is limited
and the welfare loss of lax competition policy tends to be high.
Diﬀerent from the above researchers, in this paper we discuss another policy tool to
deal with R&D incentive distortions, the intellectual property rights (IPRs). 2By IPRs
protection, the knowledge spillover rate is made endogenous and is put under the control
of the government. To determine the optimal strength of IPRs protection, the focus
of this paper is on the tension between technological progress and knowledge diﬀusion.
That is, a large spillover rate helps to strength the less eﬃcient ﬁrms and save on the
overall production costs, but, at the same time, it reduces the innovator’s incentives to
conduct R&D and results in a lower equilibrium innovation level. To clearly explain
this tradeoﬀ, we adopted a two stage asymmetric duopoly game model. And, the game
proceeds as follows: ﬁrm one, the innovator, ﬁrst invests in cost-reducing R&D and then
engages in Cournot competition with ﬁrm two, the follower, in the ﬁnal product market.
In equilibrium, the social welfare level can be expressed as a function of the spillover rate.
The ﬁrst order derivative of this relationship indicates that, if we change the extent of
knowledge spillovers four kinds of eﬀects on social welfare can be identiﬁed. And, they
are: the knowledge diﬀusion eﬀect, the production eﬀect, the indirect innovation eﬀect,
and the direct innovation eﬀect. By balancing between these eﬀects, we got the optimal
IPRs protection policy: to maximize social welfare, the strength of IPRs protection should
rise as the increase of the innovating ﬁrm’s R&D eﬃciency.
This article is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce a two stage
asymmetric duopoly game and explain how the innovating ﬁrm’s incentives to conduct
R&D will be inﬂuenced by knowledge spillovers. In section 3, given the equilibria of
the two stage game, we constructed the social welfare function, solved for the socially
optimal spillover rate, and then gave the corresponding policy suggestions. The last
section summarizes the main results.
1For policy practices, the work of Jacquemin (1988), Martin (1997), and Labory (2004) can be referred.
2A related research to this paper comes from Kang (2006). In the context of international trade,
the author discussed how a government will choose the optimal policy mix of IPR protection and R&D
subsidies to maximize the domestic exporting ﬁrm’s proﬁts. The conclusion is, a government will adopt
weak IPRs protection and subsidize the domestic ﬁrm’s R&D investments. The diﬀerence between us is
that, in this paper we adopted a domestic duopoly model setting and considered the optimal IPRs policy
from the standpoint of social welfare. Under the new criterion, a minimum strength of IPRs protection
is not necessarily socially optimal.
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2. The Basic Model
There are two ﬁrms in the market, ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2, producing homogenous goods, and
among them only ﬁrm 1 has the ability to conduct cost-reducing R&D. However, due to
the existence of spillovers, ﬁrm two can partly beneﬁt from ﬁrm one’s innovation even
though it cannot do research itself. In this section, we want to explain how ﬁrm one’s
incentives to invest in R&D will be inﬂuenced by the extent of knowledge spillovers. To
that, a two stage game is introduced. In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrm one chooses innovation
level, under which the two ﬁrms’ cost structures will be determined, and then engages in
quantity competition with ﬁrm two in the second stage game.
Suppose the representative consumer’s utility function is of the form:





where  is a constant, q1 and q2 are the quantities of products bought from ﬁrm 1 and 2,
respectively. Then, the optimal consumption behavior will lead to the following inverse
demand curve
p =    q1   q2 (2)
Based on this, the two ﬁrms’ proﬁts plus of research costs will be
1(q1;q2) = (   c1   q1   q2)q1 and 2(q1;q2) = (   c2   q1   q2)q2 (3)
where c1 and c2 are ﬁrm one and ﬁrm two’s constant marginal production costs, respec-
tively.
The game can be solved backwardly. In the second stage game, ﬁrm one and ﬁrm two
choose the output level non-cooperatively to maximize their own proﬁts, i.e.
Maxq11(q1;q2) and Maxq22(q1;q2) (4)
By the ﬁrst order conditions, we can get the equilibrium outputs
q1(c1;c2) =
   2c1 + c2
3
and q2(c1;c2) =
   2c2 + c1
3
(5)
In the ﬁrst stage game, ﬁrm 1 determines the optimal innovation level. For cost-




where k is a positive constant measuring ﬁrm one’s R&D eﬃciency. As the rise of k, the
research eﬃciency will decline. Due to the existence of knowledge spillovers, ﬁrm one’s
innovation also helps to reduce ﬁrm two’s production cost. Suppose the spillover rate is
, then given a certain innovation level, x, the two ﬁrms’ production costs will be
c1 = c0   x and c2 = c0   x (7)
where c0 is the initial production cost without innovation. Substitute Eq. (7) into Eq.
(5), the equilibrium output levels of the second stage game can be expressed as
q1(x;) =
   c0 + (2   )x
3
and q2(x;) =
   c0 + (2   1)x
3
(8)
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  2kx = 0 (10)
Based on this, we can get the equilibrium innovation level 4
x() =
2   
9k   (2   )2(   c0) (11)
It can be seen from Eq. (10), compared to the case without spillovers a new item
appears in ﬁrm one’s ﬁrst order condition, i.e. 2
3
@1
@q2. As this item is always non-positive
and the second order condition of problem (9) requires
@21(x)
@x2  0, we can conclude
that the introduction of knowledge spillovers will reduce the equilibrium innovation level.
Katz (1986) pointed out the reason: under oligopoly model setting, knowledge spillovers
strength the competitors and make the innovator suﬀer from its own innovation, which
will dampen the innovator’s incentives to do research. Diﬀerentiate Eq. (10) with respect




9k + (2   )2
[9k   (2   )2]2(   c0) < 0 (12)
That means, ﬁrm one’s incentives to conduct R&D will continue to decline as the rise of
the spillover rate.
3. Socially Optimal Spillover Rate
As analyzed in the last section, knowledge spillovers reduce ﬁrm one’s incentives to con-
duct R&D and is detrimental to technological progress. But, from the standpoint of social
welfare it also helps to raise ﬁrm two’s production eﬃciency through knowledge diﬀusion.
So, a minimum spillover rate is not necessarily the socially best choice. To maximize so-
cial welfare, we should balance between technological progress and knowledge diﬀusion.
Suppose by adjusting the strength of IPRs protection, the government can achieve any
spillover rate  2 [0;1]. In this section, our aim is to ﬁnd the optimal spillover rate under
which the social welfare will be maximized.
Based on the representative consumer’s utility function and the cost structures of the
two ﬁrms, the social welfare function can be constructed as follows






with x = x(), q1 = q1(x;), and q2 = q2(x;). Totally diﬀerentiate Eq. (13) with respect



































It can be seen that, if we change the spillover rate, four kinds of eﬀects can be identiﬁed.
And, they are:
3In the second stage game, we already know @1
@q1 = 0.




@x2  0 at x = x(), for any  2 [0;1], in what follows we assume k  2
3.
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 the knowledge diﬀusion eﬀect: @W
@ , noted as KDE






@ , noted as PE







@, noted as IIE
 the direct innovation eﬀect: @W
@x
@x
@, noted as DIE
Next, we want to brieﬂy explain each of the four eﬀects and specify their impacts on
social welfare. Firstly, the knowledge diﬀusion eﬀect, 5
KDE  0 (15)
Knowledge spillovers from the innovator will strength ﬁrm two and raise its productivity.
Then, for a given output level the overall production costs will decline as the rise of the
spillover rate. Therefore, the social welfare will improve due to this eﬀect.
Secondly, the production eﬀect, 6
PE  0 iﬀ 3k   2(1   )(2   )  0 (16)
Given a certain innovation level, the rise of  will narrow the production cost gap between
the two ﬁrms. Under strategic interactions, this will motivate ﬁrm one to reduce output
and ﬁrm two to increase output. As now a larger proportion of the overall outputs will
be produced by the less eﬃcient ﬁrm, the social welfare tends to decline. However, if the
rise of ﬁrm two’s output is suﬃciently larger than the decline of ﬁrm one’s output, social
welfare can still be increased because of the overall output expansion. So, the sigh of the
production eﬀect is ambiguous and it will depend on the relative strength of the output
reallocation eﬀect and the output expansion eﬀect. When ﬁrm one is not very productive
in R&D or the spillover rate is high, i.e. 3k   2(1   )(2   )  0, the latter dominates
and the sigh of the production eﬀect is positive.
Thirdly, the indirect innovation eﬀect, 7
IIE  0 (17)
If we increase the spillover rate, the equilibrium innovation level will decline. Under a
lower innovation level, both ﬁrms will reduce their outputs. As for the duopoly case
the equilibrium output level is always lower than social optimal, the further decline of
overall outputs will reduce social welfare. So, the sigh of the indirect innovation eﬀect is
negative.
Finally, the direct innovation eﬀect, 8
DIE  0 iﬀ (5   1)k   (1   )(2   )  0 (18)
As DIE = @W
@x
@x
@ and we already know @x
@ < 0, to specify the sign of DIE, we only
have to determine the sigh of @W
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output level to achieve the minimum production costs the ﬁrst best innovation level will
always satisfy @W
@x = 0. But, in the two stage game, as pointed out by Brander and
Spencer (1983), when R&D take place before the production stage, the innovating ﬁrm
will use it for strategic purposes rather than simply to minimize costs. The consequences
of the strategic use of R&D is that: when the spillover rate is small the equilibrium
innovation level is higher than social optimal, whereas for large spillovers the equilibrium
innovation level is lower than social optimal. So, if the initial  is small, raising it will
reduce equilibrium innovation level and increase social welfare, whereas if the initial rate
is large, further increase of spillovers is welfare reducing.
When the spillover rate changes, the relative importance of the above four eﬀects will
vary under diﬀerent parameter settings. As an example, in ﬁgure 1 we give the compari-
son results for the parameter range k   = [2
3; 5











Figure 1: The relative importance of the four eﬀects caused by spillover change 10
It can be seen that, when ﬁrm one’s R&D eﬃciency is high and the spillover rate
is small, the indirect innovation eﬀect dominates, when ﬁrm one’s innovation eﬃciency
is low and the spillover rate is not very large, the knowledge diﬀusion eﬀect dominates,
and for large spillovers the direct innovation eﬀect plays a dominant role and its sign is
negative regardless of ﬁrm one’s R&D eﬃciency. As for the production eﬀect, it never
plays a dominant role in the above parameter range. Based on the relative strength of the
four eﬀects speciﬁed in the three diﬀerent parameter regions, it can be anticipated that
the optimal spillover rate should be a declining function of ﬁrm one’s R&D eﬃciency.
And, the exact result is given by ﬁgure 2.








Figure 2: Optimal strength of IPRs protection
The rationale behind ﬁgure 2 is very straightforward. When ﬁrm one’s innovation
eﬃciency is very high, the indirect innovation eﬀect dominates. In this case, to maximize
9We use Mathematica to get the results in ﬁgure 1 and ﬁgure 2, the calculation code can be provided
upon request.
10The arrows point to the directions in which the spillover rate should be changed to increase social
welfare.
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social welfare we should maintain a strict IPRs protection. As the rise of k, the importance
of knowledge diﬀusion eﬀect increases, and now it is better to relax the IPRs protection
strength and let the follower ﬁrm enjoy some beneﬁts of ﬁrm one’s innovation. Of course,
due to the counteractive inﬂuence of the direct innovation eﬀect the spillover rate cannot
be raised unboundedly. However, as the continue decline of ﬁrm one’s innovation eﬃciency
the relative importance of direct innovation eﬀect will decline, and now to raise social
welfare we can further increase the spillovers. In all, the socially optimal spillover rate
should be a decreasing function of ﬁrm one’s R&D eﬃciency. Graphically, the optimal 
will rise as the increase of k. 11For policy concern, the government should increase the
strength of IPRs protection as the rise of the innovating ﬁrm’s R&D eﬃciency.
4. Conclusion
By adjusting the strength of IPRs protection, the government can change the extent of
knowledge spillovers in R&D. A large spillover rate helps to strength the less eﬃcient ﬁrms
and save on the overall production costs. But, at the same time, it reduces the innovator’s
incentives to conduct R&D and results in a lower equilibrium innovation level. So, there
is an inherent tension between knowledge diﬀusion and technological progress. In this
paper, we formalized this relationship in an economic model, tried to ﬁnd the socially
optimal spillover rate, and then speciﬁed the optimal IPRs protection strength.
Speciﬁcally, a two stage asymmetric duopoly game is introduced in this paper. For this
game, the equilibrium social welfare can be expressed as a function of the spillover rate.
The ﬁrst derivative of this function indicates that: if we change the extent of knowledge
spillovers four kinds of eﬀects on social welfare can be identiﬁed, the knowledge diﬀusion
eﬀect, the production eﬀect, the indirect innovation eﬀect, and the direct innovation
eﬀect. Under diﬀerent parameter settings, the relative importance of the four eﬀects will
change. By balancing between these eﬀects, we demonstrated that: the socially optimal
strength of IPRs protection should be an increasing function of the innovating ﬁrm’s
R&D eﬃciency.
11Due to the multidimensional eﬀects of spillovers on social welfare, the optimal spillover rate displays
a discontinuous characteristic at k  0:98. At this point, the maximum welfare can be realized at either
 = 0 or   0:41.
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